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EVALUATING CAUSATION IN NMHRA
RETALIATION CLAIMS AFTER NASSAR: WHY
NEW MEXICO COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A
MOTIVATING FACTOR CAUSATION STANDARD
Elisa Cibils*

New Mexico courts apply a federal burden-shifting test to decide
employment retaliation claims brought under the New Mexico
Human Rights Act (NMHRA). In New Mexico courts’ application
of this test, it is unclear whether the employee has to initially show
whether the protected activity she engaged in—such as filing a
discrimination complaint—was the “but-for” cause of the adverse
employment action against her, or if it is sufficient for her to show
that the protected activity was one motivating factor—among
other potentially lawful or non-discriminatory factors—that
contributed to the employer’s retaliatory acts against her. In light
of the recent United States Supreme Court case that requires a butfor causation standard for employment retaliation claims brought
under federal law, it is critical that New Mexico courts clarify the
causation standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in employment
retaliation claims brought under the NMHRA. This Comment
argues that New Mexico courts should adopt a motivating factor
causation standard in NMHRA retaliation claims. A motivating
factor causation standard best comports with the purpose of the
federal burden-shifting framework; New Mexico caselaw on statebased discrimination and retaliation claims; the statutory
structure of the NMHRA; and the ultimate anti-discriminatory
purpose of the NMHRA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Retaliation in the workplace is difficult to prove. An employer’s retaliation
against a worker is rarely supported by direct evidence. An employer is unlikely to
declare, “I am demoting you only because you filed a race discrimination complaint
against me.” So, courts have had to adopt an alternative methodology to resolve
employment retaliation disputes when indirect evidence is all that is available. In
New Mexico, there is an extra wrinkle in the courts’ methodology for retaliation
claims brought under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA).1 New Mexico
courts have not held which causation standard, “but-for” causation or “motivating
factor” causation, an employee must satisfy in a retaliation claim. To satisfy but-for
1. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (2020).
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causation, a plaintiff must show “‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in absence
of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.”2 To satisfy motivating factor
causation (sometimes called “mixed motives” causation), the plaintiff must show
that unlawful retaliatory or discriminatory intent was a factor that motivated the
employer’s action, even if other factors also motivated the action.3
Employment retaliation claims brought under federal law require the “butfor” causation standard, meaning an employee must prove that had she had not taken
a protected action (such as filing a complaint of discrimination or harassment), then
the employer’s adverse action against her would not have occurred.4 Other statebased employment retaliation laws only require that an employee prove that her
protected activity was a motivating factor (among other permissible factors) driving
an employer’s retaliation against an employee.5
New Mexico courts should adopt a motivating factor causation standard for
retaliation claims brought under the NMHRA for three reasons. First, New Mexico
is not bound by the but-for causation standard required in retaliation claims brought
under federal law. Second, the analytical framework that New Mexico courts have
applied for decades in discrimination and retaliation cases, the McDonnell Douglas
framework, requires a motivating factor causation standard. Third, courts should
apply a motivating factor causation standard to ensure that the NMHRA serves its
ultimate purpose to protect employees from unlawful retaliation.
Workplace retaliation claims often involve conflicting and imbalanced
evidence that is difficult to evaluate. Even if an employer provides a non-retaliatory
reason for terminating an employee, retaliatory animus could still have also
motivated the employer’s action. The NMHRA should not allow an employer to be
excused from unlawful retaliation simply because other factors also contributed to
the employer’s retaliatory action. The fact finder must have the freedom to evaluate
the employee’s claim and the employer’s counterclaim in a nuanced and holistic way

2. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(m) (West).
4. Although, technically, there could be more than one “but-for” cause driving an employer’s
adverse action, the but-for causation standard is “deterministic and it struggles to account for multiple
causes.” See Alexandra D. Lahav, Why Justice Gorsuch was Wrong About Causation in Comcast, 23
GREEN BAG 205, 207 (2020). But see Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (“When it
comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot
avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So
long as the plaintiff ‘s sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.”).
5. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Grey Wolf Drilling, L.P., 350 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding
discrimination claims brought under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act require a motivating
factor causation standard); Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 842 (Alaska 2010) (holding that
plaintiff can bring mixed-motive age discrimination claim under Alaska Human Rights Act); Harris v.
City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 55 (Cal. 2013) (holding California Fair Employment and Housing Act
discrimination claims require substantial factor causation standard); W. Va. Am. Water Co. v. Nagy, No.
101229, 2011 WL 8583425, at *20 (W. Va. June 15, 2011) (holding West Virginia Human Rights Act
discrimination claims require motivating factor causation standard); Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,
936 N.Y.S.2d 112, 121 (App. Div. 2011) (holding New York City Administrative Code discrimination
claims required mixed motive causation standard); see also Kevin J. Koai, Judicial Federalism and
Causation in State Employment Discrimination Statutes, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 763, 778–85 (2019)
(synthesizing state caselaw that has declined to apply a but-for causation standard in discrimination and
retaliation claims brought under state law).
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to reach a fair determination. But-for causation does not provide that necessary
freedom.
This Comment first summarizes two state and federal statutes governing
retaliation in the workplace. Second, it turns to the federal burden-shifting test that
New Mexico courts apply to decide discrimination and retaliation claims brought
under the NMHRA and the issue of causation within that framework. Third, it turns
to the United States Supreme Court case that has applied a but-for causation standard
to retaliation claims arising under federal law. Finally, this Comment argues that, in
light of this recent federal holding, New Mexico should officially establish a
motivating factor causation standard in employment retaliation claims brought under
the NMHRA.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

New Mexico Human Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.

The New Mexico Human Rights Act (“NMHRA” or “the Act”) was enacted
in 1969 “for the primary purpose of providing administrative and judicial remedies
for unlawful discrimination in the workplace.”6 Under NMSA 1978, Section 28-1-7
(2020), “Unlawful discriminatory practice,” the Act forbids both status-based
discrimination7 and retaliation. The Act defines retaliation as “any form of threats,
reprisal or discrimination against any person who has opposed any unlawful
discriminatory practice or has filed a complaint, testified or participated in any
proceeding under the Human Rights Act.”8 If an individual suffers an unlawful
discriminatory practice under the statute, she must first exhaust her administrative
remedies by filing a complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Board or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before taking her claim to
district court.9 This Comment only examines those retaliation claims that have made
it to the courts after the employee completed the administrative process.10

6. Lobato v. State Env’t Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 267 P.3d 65, 67.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(A) (2020) (“It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for: A. an
employer, unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification or other statutory prohibition, to refuse
to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment against any person otherwise qualified because of race, age, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth or condition
related to pregnancy or childbirth, physical or mental handicap or serious medical condition, or, if the
employer has fifty or more employees, spousal affiliation; provided, however, that 29 U.S.C. Section
631(c)(1) and (2) shall apply to discrimination based on age.”).
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(I)(2) (2020).
9. Luboyeski v. Hill, 1994-NMSC-032, ¶ 7, 117 N.M. 380, 872 P.2d 353, 382.
10. Retaliation claims make up 38% of the total claims filed with the Human Rights Board between
2008 and 2020. The New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions does not have available data about
how many New Mexico Human Rights Board decisions are later appealed to district court. (E-mail from
Department of Workforce Solutions, Office of the General Counsel, to author (Sept. 27, 2020, 1:23 MST)
(on file with author)).
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The New Mexico legislature modeled the NMHRA after its federal
analogue, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Title VII also prohibits statusbased discrimination and retaliation in the workplace.12 The NMHRA’s language
closely tracks the language in the federal statute, with some important differences.
First, the status-based discrimination provision of the NMHRA is in the same section
of the statute as the retaliation provision (Section 28-1-7). In Title VII, the provisions
are in different sections of the statute (Section 2000e-2 and Section 2000e-3).
Second, the status-based discrimination section of Title VII explicitly states the
required causation standard, indicating, “an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.”13 Congress codified this motivating factor
causation standard for status-based discrimination claims in 1991.14 New Mexico did
not adopt the motivating factor statutory language that Congress added to the statute.
There is no causation standard in the retaliation section of Title VII, nor in the
analogous status-based discrimination and retaliation provisions of the NMHRA.
These differences between the NMHRA and Title VII are important to
understand why the federal, judicially created but-for causation standard for Title
VII retaliation claims should not apply to state-based retaliation claims in New
Mexico, discussed below in Part III.D.
B.

McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework: Purpose and
Causation.

New Mexico’s state and federal courts apply the same analytical framework
to determine both status-based discrimination and retaliation claims brought under
both the NMHRA and Title VII. Following the Tenth Circuit’s approach, the New
11. See JOHN E. SANCHEZ AND ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYMENT LIABILITY § 19:19 (Nov. 2020) (“Most states and a host of municipalities have enacted fair
employment practices acts, modeled on Title VII, that afford broader protection than federal
law. Title VII plainly allows states to enact such anti-discrimination statutes so long as they do not conflict
with the federal law.”).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West) (defining status-based discrimination as “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-3 (West) (defining retaliation as “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labormanagement committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job
training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”).
13. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added).
14. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West); see also Prince Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
249 (1989) (holding motivating factor causation standard required for Title VII retaliation claims, which
was later codified in the United States Code in 1991).
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Mexico Supreme Court adopted the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green to decide discrimination and retaliation claims
brought under the NMHRA.15 The McDonnell Douglas framework includes three
steps: (1) the employee establishes a prima facie discrimination or retaliation case;
(2) the employer then provides a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for its
“adverse employment action”; and (3) the employee rebuts the employer’s offered
reason by showing that it is “pretextual or otherwise inadequate.”16
1.

Step-by-Step Analysis of the McDonnell Douglas Framework.

The McDonnell Douglas framework provides a “method of proving
causation” when there is no “direct proof” of an employer’s discriminatory intent.17
But, the framework does not actually provide a causation standard (such as “but-for”
or “motivating factor”).18 That is, the Court in McDonnell Douglas did not explicitly
hold whether the employee must demonstrate that the protected activity she engaged
in was the but-for cause of the employer’s retaliation or whether it is sufficient for
an employee to show that the protected activity was a motivating factor—among
other potentially lawful or non-retaliatory factors—that drove the employer’s
adverse action against the employee.
New Mexico courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework since
1990.19 In its application of the McDonnell Douglas test, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that only motivating factor causation was required for discrimination
claims brought under the NMHRA.20 But, New Mexico courts have not explicitly
held which causation standard should apply to NMHRA retaliation claims.
Causation is at issue for the employee’s claim at two steps of the McDonnell
Douglas test: at the initial prima facie stage and in the final stage of the test when
the employee bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. A closer look at the three steps
of the analysis and the interaction between the steps supports a finding that New
15. The United States Supreme Court originally designed the McDonnell Douglas framework to
determine discrimination cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for instances when there was
no “direct proof” of an employer’s discriminatory intent. Since there is rarely direct proof of such intent,
courts usually apply this framework to discrimination and retaliation claims. See Gonzalez v. N.M. Dep’t
of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 2, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550, 553; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).
16. Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548, 551; McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–05.
17. Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 9, 10, 109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433, 436, 437.
18. Joss Teal, A Survivor’s Tale: McDonnell Douglas in a Post-Nassar World, 55 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 937, 965 (2018).
19. See Smith, 1990-NMSC-020. (earliest application of the McDonnell Douglas framework in New
Mexico).
20. See Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571, 574 (“Thus, it
appears under federal law that an employee is not required to prove that his or her sex was the sole or
primary motivation for the suffered harassment. The employee must only establish that the adverse
employment action was motivated in part by an illegitimate factor, such as sex.”); cf. UJI 13-2304 NMRA
(Retaliatory Discharge Uniform Jury Instruction states: “In determining whether (employee) was
discharged because [he] [she] [insert conduct court has determined is protected by public policy], you
must determine whether that conduct was a motivating factor in the decision to discharge [him][her]. A
motivating factor is a factor that plays a role in the decision to discharge. It need not be the only reason,
nor the last nor latest reason, for the discharge.”).
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Mexico courts should apply a motivating factor causation standard to retaliation
claims brought under the NMHRA. To make its determination, the fact finder must
use a holistic approach that requires the court to evaluate all relevant factors and
context in a way that cannot be done using a but-for causation standard.
In the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test, an employee must establish
a prima facie retaliation claim by proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that “(1)
she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she was subject to adverse employment
action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.”21 An adverse employment action, for purposes of this
analysis under the NMHRA, “refers broadly to ‘threats, reprisals or
discrimination.’”22 If an employee establishes a prima facie case, then she establishes
a presumption that the employer’s adverse action against her was unlawfully
discriminatory.23
In the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the employer must
rebut this presumption.24 The employer bears a relatively light burden: it must only
“raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant acted in a discriminatory
manner against the plaintiff.”25 The employer must only offer a “clear and reasonably
specific” explanation for its adverse employment action or “[produce] evidence of
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.”26 The employer does not need to persuade
the court that it had “convincing, objective reasons” for its adverse employment
action.27 The fact finder relies on fact-specific, circumstantial evidence to determine
whether the employer presented sufficient evidence to show non-retaliatory
motive.28 The fact finder must use circumstantial evidence because there is rarely
documentation of “retaliatory motive.”29 The fact finder may evaluate the temporal
proximity between an employee’s protected action and the employer’s act.30 The fact
finder must also determine if written warnings or reprimands—when available—
were solely related to work performance or if the circumstances indicate the
employer issued the documents with retaliatory intent.31
In the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee bears
the ultimate “burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff.”32 The fact finder may infer that the employer
acted with discriminatory intent if the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to
21. Gonzalez v. N.M. Dep’t. of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 22, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550, 558.
22. Id. ¶ 23, 11 P.3d at 558.
23. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
24. Id. at 255.
25. See Teal, supra note 18; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
26. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 257 (“[T]o satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only
produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the
employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus.”).
27. Id. at 256–57.
28. Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 22, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548, 554.
29. Id. ¶ 23, 127 P.3d at 555.
30. Id. ¶ 22, 127 P.3d at 554.
31. Id. ¶ 25, 127 P.3d at 555.
32. Gonzalez v. N.M. Dept. of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550, 557
(quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at
255 (1981).
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challenge the employer’s non-discriminatory motivations.33 Both the plaintiff’s
rebuttal—showing that the employer’s alternative reason for its action was pretextual
or insufficient—and the employee’s initial prima facie case shape the fact finder’s
final determination.34 The fact finder comes to its ultimate finding by considering all
relevant details that could have contributed to the employer’s action against an
employee. The New Mexico Supreme Court has even considered evidence of the
employer’s actions against the employee before the employee filed a discrimination
complaint with the EEOC.35 The court asserted that the preliminary facts provided
necessary context to evaluate the retaliation claim.36
2.

Purpose of the McDonnell Douglas Framework.

The McDonnell Douglas approach aspires to fairness in the absence of
direct evidence.37 The United States Supreme Court stated: “The McDonnell
Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and
the court expeditiously and fairly” to a determination of discrimination or
retaliation.38 The McDonnell Douglas approach upholds—or at least, tries to
uphold—the anti-discriminatory purpose of Title VII and the NMHRA, while also
accounting for the messy reality of workplace discrimination and retaliation. An
employer’s retaliatory animus is not always obvious, and it is not always direct.
Behind every employer-employee interaction is a unique history, shaped by different
subjectivities and power differences.
In this uncertain context, the McDonnell Douglas framework was designed
to ensure that employees have their day in court.39 In New Mexico, an at-will
employee “may be discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason at all,”
barring an exception.40 Moreover, an employee does not always have access to an
employer’s business records and other “objective” proof, such as a written warning
or demerit, which a fact finder may find more convincing than an employee’s
collection of anecdotes about an abusive boss.41 The McDonnell Douglas framework
tries to account for these and other potential workplace imbalances. It provides an
employee the opportunity to establish a presumption of discrimination or retaliation
and an opportunity to rebut an employer’s counterclaim, if it is indeed only pretext
33. Sonntag v. Shaw, 2001-NMSC-015, ¶ 27, 130 N.M. 238, 22 P.3d 1188, 1197.
34. Id.; Juneau, 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 25, 127 P.3d at 555.
35. Juneau, 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 14, 127 P.3d at 552.
36. Id.
37. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“The broad, overriding
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured
through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such
decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”).
38. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
39. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“The shifting burdens of proof
set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure the plaintiff has his day in court despite the
unavailability of direct evidence.”).
40. UJI 13–2301 NMRA; see also William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the Tortification of
Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1041 (2014).
41. See Maria Greco Danaher, Plaintiff Bears the Ultimate Burden of Proving Retaliatory Motive, 11
NO. 5 LAWS. J. 2, 10 (“[O]bjective and complete documentation of a company’s business decision is
integral to a favorable result in a claim related to that decision.”).
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for discrimination or retaliation. It also extends fairness to the employer in the second
step of the framework, where the employer only has a burden to produce a reasonable
explanation for its actions without actually having the final burden to persuade the
fact finder.42 The framework ultimately provides a mechanism for the fact finder to
evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding an alleged retaliatory incident.
3.

McDonnell Douglas and Causation.

Application of the McDonnell Douglas framework does not prove but-for
causation.43 When the fact finder carries through the McDonnell Douglas test to the
third step, the fact finder eliminates one non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action: the employer’s proffered justification. But, the framework “does
not eliminate all potential non-discriminatory reasons” for the employer’s action.44
Other non-discriminatory reasons may also exist. No single inference, fact, or factor
must be the but-for cause of the retaliation using the McDonnell Douglas
framework.45 The fact finder reaches its ultimate determination by evaluating the
totality of the circumstances—not by eliminating every non-discriminatory reason
for an employer’s adverse action against a worker. So, the fact finder evaluates the
evidence presented at the three steps of the analysis; the ways in which those pieces
of evidence interact; and which are ultimately more convincing.
To reach a fair and equitable outcome, the McDonnell Douglas approach
requires a holistic evaluation of messy, conflicting, imbalanced facts. That type of
evaluation requires the fact finder to use a motivating factor causation standard. Butfor causation does not provide the necessary balance and nuance that this evaluation
of workplace conflict requires. Multiple factors could have motivated an employer’s
retaliation. But the action, ultimately, could still have been retaliatory. The antidiscriminatory purpose of Title VII and the NMHRA can be enforced fairly and
equitably if the fact finder incorporates a motivating factor causation standard in its
McDonnell Douglas analysis.
C.

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar and But-For
Causation in Title VII Retaliation Claims.

But, in its 2013 decision, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
v. Nassar, the United States Supreme Court did not find that Title VII retaliation
claims required a motivating factor causation standard. In Nassar, a physician
brought suit against his employer, alleging his employer retaliated against him by
not hiring him for a higher position after he made complaints of race- and religionbased harassment.46 Without a single reference to McDonnell Douglas, the Court
held that a but-for causation standard was required for employment retaliation claims
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.47 The Court stated that
employees must prove that their complaints or opposition to discrimination in the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
See Teal supra note 18, at 963.
Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 134 (2007).
Id.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 345 (2013).
Id. at 352.
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workplace—the protected activity—was the but-for cause of the retaliation they
suffered.48
The Court in Nassar drew from its holding and reasoning in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services.49 In Gross, the Court held that, in claims brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Action (ADEA), an employee must prove her
protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action.50 In
Nassar, the Court adopted the definition of “because” implemented by the Court in
Gross.51 The Court interpreted the word “because” in the anti-retaliation provision
of Title VII to mean that the employer’s retaliation would not have occurred but-for,
or in absence of, the employee’s protected complaint or other action against
workplace discrimination.52
Even though Title VII specifically requires that employees prove statusbased discrimination claims using a motivating factor causation standard under
Section 2000e-2, the Court in Nassar found that the Legislature did not intend for
that standard to apply to retaliation claims under Section 2000e-3.53 The Court found
that the motivating factor standard explicitly stated in the statute should not apply to
retaliation claims brought under Title VII because the anti-retaliation provision of
the law was in a separate section from the status-based discrimination provision.54
The Court noted, “Just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so
too are its structural choices.”55 The Court indicated that if Congress had intended
for the motivating factor test to apply to the retaliation provision of the law, then it
would have placed the test in another section that applied to the “rules and remedies
for all Title VII enforcement actions,” not just the section that applied to status-based
discrimination actions.56
The Court reasoned that a higher but-for causation standard is necessary in
cases of retaliation to prevent “frivolous claims” and “unfounded charges” of
discrimination leading to false retaliation claims after an employee suffers an
“undesired change in employment circumstances.”57 According to the Court, a
lessened causation standard would “be inconsistent with the structure and operation
of Title VII” because it would raise costs, “both financial and reputational,” for
innocent employers.58 The Court did not address the required administrative process
that may block frivolous and unfounded retaliation claims from reaching a district
court.
The Court in Nassar never mentioned McDonnell Douglas’s burdenshifting framework. There is no indication that the Court had the intention of doing

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 343.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).
Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 358.
Id.
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away with the decades-old framework altogether, either.59 This omission left the door
open for the lower courts to interpret how to incorporate the Nassar holding into the
McDonnell Douglas framework. There is disagreement between the circuit courts
about whether or not but-for causation applies to the first stage—when the employee
makes a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim—of the framework after Nassar.60
There is also disagreement among state courts (and federal courts interpreting state
law) about whether the but-for causation standard should apply to retaliation claims
brought under state laws, like the NMHRA.61
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Nassar Does Not Govern the Causation Standard for NMHRA
Retaliation Claims.

After Nassar, New Mexico state courts have not held whether they adopt or
reject a but-for causation standard for NMHRA retaliation claims. New Mexico
federal courts have explicitly noted the state courts’ silence on this matter.62 Still,
since Nassar, New Mexico courts continue to apply the burden-shifting framework
to employment retaliation claims without specifying the required causation standard.
Even in a post-Nassar world, New Mexico courts should continue to apply
the widely accepted McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to NMHRA
retaliation claims, with a motivating factor causation requirement. Even though New
Mexico courts have looked to federal law to decide how to analyze employmentbased retaliation and discrimination claims, New Mexico courts have also repeatedly
asserted that they are not bound by the federal approach and are free to depart from
it.63 Here, New Mexico courts should distinguish their approach from the federal one.
Generally, as discussed in Part II.B.3. above, a fair and holistic application
of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires a motivating factor causation
59. Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Had the Nassar Court
intended to retire McDonnell Douglas and set aside 40 years of precedent, it would have spoken plainly
and clearly to that effect.”).
60. Id. at n.10 (listing cases that make up the circuit split).
61. Koai, supra note 5 (stating that Kentucky, Florida, Louisiana, Idaho, and Illinois have applied the
but-for causation standard to discrimination and retaliation claims brought under state law after Nassar.
Texas, New York, West Virginia, Alaska, and California have declined to apply the but-for causation
standard to discrimination and retaliation claims brought under state law after Nassar.).
62. See Hernandez v. City of Sunland Park, No. 12-CV-00176 MCA/WPL, 2013 WL 12329160, at
*5 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2013) (“Plaintiff points out that Nassar is not directly controlling as to her claim
under the New Mexico Human Rights Act . . . Given significant differences in the language employed by
Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and the New Mexico Legislature, NMSA 1978, § 28-1-7(J), it is not at
all clear that the New Mexico Supreme Court would adopt the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in Nassar.”); Lobato v. New Mexico Env’t Dep’t, 733 F.3d 1283, 1297 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The
Supreme Court recently established that for a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant would not have taken the adverse employment action “but for” the impermissible motive . . .
The New Mexico Supreme Court has yet to interpret the New Mexico Human Rights Act as also imposing
this standard.”).
63. Gonzalez v. N.M. Dep’t. of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550, 593
(quoting Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶ 9, 109 N.M. 514, 517, 787 P.2d 433, 436); Sonntag,
2001-NMSC-015, ¶ 24, 22 P.3d 1188, 1196; Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004-NMSC-018, ¶ 23, 68–69;
Goodman v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC, 2020-NMCA-019, ¶ 22, 461 P.3d 906, 913.
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standard. Specifically, New Mexico caselaw; the statutory construction of the
NMHRA; and the NMHRA’s purpose all support a motivating factor causation
standard.
1.

New Mexico Caselaw.

a. Behrmann v. Phototron Corporation: Combined Jury Instructions on Motivating
Factor Causation and McDonnell Douglas are Compatible.
In 1990, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that two jury instructions—
one instructing the jury on motivating factor causation and the other on the
McDonnell Douglas framework—were correctly given together in an NMHRA
discrimination claim. In Behrmann v. Phototron Corporation, a female salesperson
sued her employer after she was allegedly fired because she was pregnant.64 Her
employer alleged that she was terminated because of “economic reorganization.”65
But, her supervisor also told her, “You’ll probably not want to come back to work
anyway. Having a baby will really change you,” and proceeded to hire a new, higherpaid male employee to replace her.66
The trial court in Behrmann rejected the employer’s proposed jury
instruction that included a but-for causation standard, which stated, “If you find that
Phototron had a non-discriminatory business reason for discharging plaintiff, you
must find for Phototron.”67 The trial court then instructed the jury to find for the
employee in a sex discrimination case if the jury found that the employer laid off the
employee “with an improper motive based on pregnancy.”68 The trial court’s
instruction was a mixed motives or motivating factor instruction because it allowed
for the jury to find the employer liable for discrimination when it acted with
discriminatory motive, even if the employer also had other non-discriminatory
reasons for terminating the employee. The jury also received an instruction on the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The employer argued that these two
instructions were contradictory and should not have been issued together.69 The New
Mexico Supreme Court disagreed. The court found that “the evidence supported both
instructions and the court was justified in giving both instructions.”70
b.

Nava v. City of Santa Fe: NMHRA Discrimination Claims Already
Require Motivating Factor Causation Standard.

In its 2004 decision, Nava v. City of Santa Fe, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that a motivating factor causation standard should apply to an employee’s
NMHRA discrimination claim. In Nava, the City of Santa Fe appealed a female
police officer’s sex-based discrimination claim against her sergeant after he “raised

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Behrmann v. Phototron Corp., 1990-NMSC-073, ¶ 1, 110 N.M. 323, 795 P.2d 1015, 1016.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 795 P.2d at 1016.
Id. ¶ 5, 795 P.2d at 1016.
Id. ¶ 4, 795 P.2d at 1016.
Id. ¶ 13, 795 P.2d at 1018.
Id. ¶ 15, 795 P.2d at 1018.
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his voice to her, denied her many of the same privileges male officers were afforded,
followed her to her house to monitor how long she took on bathroom breaks, [and]
assigned rape calls to her even when other officers were closer to the scene of the
crime.”71 At trial, the judge had instructed the jury that it only needed to find that the
“plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the treatment of the plaintiff” to satisfy the
causation standard in the discrimination case.72 The instruction did not require the
jury to find that “sex was the [Defendant’s] . . . sole motivation or even the primary
motivation” for the employer’s adverse action against the plaintiff.73
On appeal, the City of Santa Fe in Nava argued that the jury should have
been given a but-for causation instruction.74 The court disagreed. The court held that
the trial court correctly issued a motivating factor jury instruction for a sex-based
discrimination claim brought under the NMHRA.75 The court turned to the federal
approach to discrimination claims at the time to make its determination. Federal law
only required that an employee prove that “the adverse employment action was
motivated in part by the illegitimate factor” and not “to prove that [the illegitimate
factor] was the sole or primary motivation” for the adverse employment action
suffered.76
Even though the court in Nava drew from the federal approach at the time
to make its determination, the New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately looked to the
New Mexico-specific context and state-specific legislative intent to make its final
determination that the trial court properly issued the motivating factor jury
instruction. The court found that, since the purpose of the NMHRA is to “prohibit
all forms of sexual harassment,” the legislature did not intend for the statute to
provide relief to an employer in a discrimination claim “simply because other factors
aside from sex contributed to making the employee’s work environment hostile and
abusive.”77
Nava is still good law. The court in Nava reasoned the NMHRA required a
motivating factor causation standard to “prohibit all forms” of sex discrimination
even when “other factors aside from sex” contributed to the discrimination.78 The
same reasoning should apply to retaliation claims: the NMHRA requires a
motivating factor causation standard to prohibit all forms of retaliation, even when
other factors contributed to the employer’s action. Without “prohibiting all forms”
of retaliation with the aid of a motivating factor causation standard, the antiretaliation provision of the NMHRA would not serve its ultimate purpose of
preventing unlawful discrimination—and subsequent retaliation—in the workplace.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 2, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571, 573.
Id. ¶ 7, 103 P.3d at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9, 103 P.3d at 575.
Id. ¶ 8, 103 P.3d at 574.
Id. ¶ 9, 103 P.3d at 575.
Id. ¶ 8, 103 P.3d at 574.
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Juneau v. Intel Corp.: New Mexico is Not Bound by the Federal
Approach to Causation.

It is undeniable that New Mexico courts draw from federal statutory
construction and federal analytical frameworks in their own analyses of state law.
For example, New Mexico courts adhere to the federal McDonnell Douglas
framework and draw from federal interpretation of Title VII in their statutory
interpretation of the NMHRA. But, New Mexico courts have also repeatedly asserted
that “we are not binding New Mexico law to interpretations made by the federal
courts of the federal statute.”79 The New Mexico Supreme Court acted on this
assertion in its 2006 decision, Juneau v. Intel Corporation. The court declined to
adopt the Tenth Circuit’s inference of causation it applied in retaliation claims.80 In
1996, the Tenth Circuit adopted an inference of causation when there was “temporal
proximity” between the employee’s protected action and the employer’s adverse
employment action in a Title VII retaliation claim.81 In Juneau, the New Mexico
Supreme Court found that “the fact-finder should be free to consider timing and
proximity, along with all the other facts and circumstances, in deciding the ultimate
issue of causation.”82 The court declined to hold what amount of time was required
between a protected activity and an employer’s negative act to establish an inference
of causation between the two actions in an NMHRA retaliation claim.83
New Mexico courts declined to adopt the temporal proximity approach of
the Tenth Circuit. So, New Mexico courts should also adopt an independent approach
to causation in NMHRA retaliation claims.84 Because the fact finder must evaluate
the totality of the circumstances to determine retaliation under the NMHRA, the
evaluation requires a motivating factor causation standard. The standard accounts for
the way that different “facts and circumstances” interact and overlap to create
retaliatory animus and illegal retaliatory effects.85 New Mexico courts should follow
their own independent construction of the NMHRA, like the New Mexico Supreme
Court did in Juneau, and break away from the federal but-for causation standard that
the Tenth Circuit applies in Title VII retaliation claims.86

79. Gonzalez v. N.M. Dep’t. of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550, 593
(quoting Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶ 9, 109 N.M. 514, 517, 787 P.2d 433, 436); Sonntag v.
Shaw, 2001-NMSC-015, ¶ 24, 130 N.M. 238, 22 P.3d 1188, 1196; Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004NMSC-018, ¶ 23, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58, 68–69; Goodman v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC, 2020NMCA-019, ¶ 22, 461 P.3d 906, 913.
80. Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 22, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548, 554 (declining to adopt
inference stated in Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 328 (10th Cir. 1996)).
81. Marx, 76 F.3d at 328.
82. Juneau, 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 22, 127 P.3d at 554.
83. Id.
84. A jury could apply different causation standards to federal and state claim brought together. Juries
already have to understand the different causation standards when federal status-based claims are brought
with federal retaliation claims. See Koai, supra note 5, at 793–94.
85. See Juneau, 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 22, 127 P.3d at 554.
86. See Ward v. Jewell, 772 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff’s prima facie
retaliation claim must meet but-for causation standard).
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Slusser v. Vantage Builders: But-For Causation Renders McDonnell
Douglas meaningless.

A year before the United States Supreme Court decided Nassar, the District
Court of New Mexico applied a but-for causation standard to an age discrimination
claim that an employee brought under the NMHRA.87 In Slusser v. Vantage Builders,
the District Court of New Mexico cited the United States Supreme Court’s but-for
requirement in Gross v. FBL Financial Services (the case that the Nassar Court later
relied on to reach its holding that Title VII retaliation claims required but-for
causation).88 The District Court found the federal Gross standard “applicable to age
claims under the New Mexico Human Rights Act.”89
By the time Slusser reached the New Mexico Court of Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court had already decided Nassar. Still, the New Mexico court made
no reference to Nassar. On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals declined to
decide whether New Mexico should adopt a but-for causation standard for age
discrimination claims brought under the NMHRA.90 In its analysis of the caselaw,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Slusser described a but-for causation standard
and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach as mutually exclusive,
contrary approaches.91 In its brief analysis of the issue, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals distinguished the Gross but-for approach from the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s approach in an age discrimination claim in Cates v. Regents of the N.M.
Institute of Mining and Technology.92 In Gross, according to the court, the but-for
cause analysis eliminated the burden-shifting analysis: the employer’s discrimination
was either the sole cause of the employer’s adverse action or it was not.93 In Cates,
the New Mexico Supreme Court applied the burden-shifting approach to an age
discrimination claim.94 In its brief parenthetical explanation of the “Cates method of
proof,” the Court in Slusser did not describe the causation standard that it thought
the court used in Cates.95
In Slusser, the New Mexico Court of Appeals showed that but-for causation
undermined the fairness interests underlying the McDonnell Douglas framework;
but-for causation and the McDonnell Douglas framework are mutually exclusive.
With but-for causation, the burden of production would rarely shift to the employer
and back to the employee in a retaliation case.96 If an employee did make it to the

87. Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., No. D202CV200811310, 2011 WL 12525466, at *1 (N.M.
Dist. Jan. 24, 2011).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 2013-NMCA-073, ¶ 25, 306 P.3d 524, 534 (“[W]e leave for
another day the decision regarding the application of the Cates method of proof in light of Gross.”).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Cates v. Regents of the N.M Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 17–21, 124 N.M. 633,
954 P.2d 65, 70–71.
95. Slusser, 2013-NMCA-073, ¶ 25, 306 P.3d at 534.
96. See Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (“If plaintiffs can
prove but-for causation at the prima facie stage, they will necessarily be able to satisfy their ultimate
burden of persuasion without proceeding through the pretext analysis. Conversely, plaintiffs who cannot
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third step, the pretext stage of the analysis, it would only be after she could show that
the protected action she took was the “actual,” “only,” or “but-for” reason for the
employer’s retaliation against her.97 Given the lack of direct evidence in employment
retaliation cases, this would be difficult to do. Further, if an employee were able to
show but-for causation in the first step of the three-step analysis, that employee
would not need the third pretext stage at all. In McDonnell Douglas, the United States
Supreme Court indicated that the third step in the burden-shifting framework is
necessary to afford an employee “a fair opportunity” to demonstrate that the
employer’s reasons given were pretext or “discriminatory in its application.”98 A butfor causation standard renders the McDonnell Douglas framework meaningless.
e.

Jury Instructions and Goodman v. OS Restaurant Services: No Causation
Standard Leads to Jury Confusion.

Jury instructions for retaliation claims brought under the NMHRA are
inconsistent. The instructions do not specify the causation standard that the jury
should apply to determine if the employer retaliated against its employee for a
protected reason. A 2013 jury instruction for an NMHRA race discrimination and
retaliation claim simply restated the language in the Act, without further clarification
or interpretation of the statutory elements.99 In a 2015 case, an employee filed an
NMHRA retaliation claim after filing gender and ethnicity-based discrimination
complaints.100 The jury instruction in that case indicated that there must be a “causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”101
The jury instruction did not contain any elaboration on what causation standard was
required to establish a “causal connection.”102 The retaliation instruction also
explained the burden-shifting between the employee and employer and that the
“Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the retaliation was a cause of damages.”103
The instruction did not specify what causation standard was required to establish “a
cause of damages.”
In Goodman v. OS Restaurant Services, the New Mexico District Court
instructed the jury that the employee had to show that “retaliation was a cause of the

satisfy their ultimate burden of persuasion without the support of pretext evidence would never be
permitted past the prima facie stage to reach the pretext stage.”).
97. Id. at 251.
98. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
99. Jury Instruction, Granados v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Dona Ana County, No.
D307CV201101404, 2013 WL 9776869, at *1 (N.M. Dist. June 21, 2013) (“In this case you must
determine whether Dona Ana County violated a statute known as the New Mexico Human Rights Act. 1.
An employer violates the New Mexico Human Rights Act if it fires or discriminates in matters of
compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of employment against an otherwise qualified person based
on national origin. 2. An employer violates the New Mexico Human Rights Act if it engages in any form
of threat, retaliation, or discrimination against any person who has opposed any unlawful discriminatory
practice.”).
100. Ortega v. City of Albuquerque, No. CV 2013-04709, 2015 WL 2441649 (N.M. Dist. Mar. 20,
2015).
101. Jury Instruction, Ortega v. City of Albuquerque, No. CV 2013-04709, 2015 WL 2441649 (N.M.
Dist. Mar. 20, 2015).
102. The record does not indicate whether the court provided a separate jury instruction on causation.
103. Jury Instruction, Ortega, 2015 WL 2441649.
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injuries and damages” he incurred, after he suffered a workplace injury; filed a
Workers’ Compensation claim; and then was terminated.104 Although not at issue,
the jury instruction did not contain a specific causation standard.105 On appeal, the
jury instruction’s meaning and contents were disputed and scrutinized.106 The
employer argued that the jury instruction was improperly given because it was
unclear whether the retaliation claim was based on the employee’s physical handicap
or because of his Workers’ Compensation claim.107 Ultimately, the court upheld the
jury’s findings because the employer had not preserved its objection to the jury
instructions.108
The confusion and disagreement over the jury instruction in Goodman were
not explicitly about the causation standard. But, the confusion in Goodman could
have been avoided if the court had provided the jury an instruction with a specific
causation standard. A jury instruction with an explicit causation standard must point
to the reasons for the retaliation that the employee suffered. Here, a causation
standard in the jury instruction would have clarified whether the worker’s injury, his
Workers’ Compensation claim, or both, were reasons for the employer’s retaliation.
A jury instruction with an explicit causation standard would also give the jury precise
language and a workable mechanism to use in its deliberation of the facts.
New Mexico already has Uniform Jury Instructions on causation that could
be applied to or adapted for NMHRA retaliation claims. First, UJI 13-305 NMRA,
“Causation,” explains what proximate cause means for a tort case. Cause is defined
as follows: “an injury or damage is caused, or contributed to, by an act or a failure to
act when the act or failure to act played any part, no matter how small, in bringing
about the injury or damage.”109
Second, UJI 13-2304 NMRA, the Uniform Jury Instruction on retaliatory
discharge in violation of public policy, explicitly states a motivating factor causation
standard. The instruction states that, in its determination of whether an employee was
terminated because she engaged in protected conduct, “[the jury] must determine
whether that conduct was a motivating factor in the decision to discharge [him] [her].
A motivating factor is a factor that plays a role in the decision to discharge. It need
not be the only reason, nor the last nor latest reason, for the discharge.”110
Jury instructions from Goodman and other New Mexico District Court
cases demonstrate the confusion that the lack of a causation standard can create. For
a fact finder to accurately determine whether the plaintiff met her “ultimate burden
of persuading the court” in the third step of the McDonnell Douglas test, the required
causation standard must be explicitly stated.111 New Mexico trial courts may draw

104. Jury Instruction, Goodman v. OS Rest. Servs, LLC, No. CV-2012-1188, 2015 WL 13840352
(N.M. Dist. June 10, 2015).
105. The record does not indicate whether the court provided a separate jury instruction on causation.
106. Goodman v. OS Rest. Servs. LLC, 2020-NMCA-019 ¶¶ 36–38, 461 P.3d 906, 917–18.
107. Id. ¶ 9, 461 P.3d at 910.
108. Id. ¶ 40, 461 P.3d at 919.
109. UJI 13-915 NMRA.
110. UJI 13-2304 NMRA.
111. See Bovee v. State Highway. and Transp. Dep’t, 2003-NMCA-025, ¶ 14, 133 N.M. 519, 65 P.3d
254, 259.

496

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 2

from existing Uniform Jury Instructions to provide jury instructions on causation for
NMHRA retaliation cases.
f.

New Mexico Caselaw Supports a Motivating Factor Causation Standard
for NMHRA Retaliation Claims.

In sum, the reasoning of New Mexico courts outlined above supports a
motivating factor causation standard in NMHRA retaliation claims. The New
Mexico Supreme Court has already found that combined jury instructions on
motivating factor causation and McDonnell Douglas are complementary and may be
issued together.112 The court has also explicitly held that NMHRA discrimination
claims require a motivating factor causation standard.113 Even though Title VII
retaliation claims require a but-for causation standard, New Mexico courts are not
bound by the federal approach in their own analyses of NMHRA retaliation
claims.114 If New Mexico courts did apply a but-for causation standard to NMHRA
retaliation claims, such an analysis would render the well-established McDonnell
Douglas framework meaningless.115 New Mexico should explicitly adopt a
motivating factor causation standard in NMHRA retaliation claims to avoid jury
confusion and to further the reasoning and objectives established by decades of New
Mexico caselaw.
2.

Statutory Construction of NMHRA Supports Motivating Factor
Causation Standard for NMHRA Retaliation Claims.

The structural differences between Title VII and the NMHRA outlined in
Part II.A., above, support a finding that New Mexico courts should apply a
motivating factor causation standard to NMHRA retaliation claims. Unlike Title
VII’s status-based discrimination provision, the NMHRA provision on status-based
discrimination does not contain an explicit motivating factor causation requirement.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Nava determined that status-based
discrimination claims brought under the NMHRA should be determined using
motivating factor causation. Now, it is up to the courts to determine whether the same
motivating factor causation standard should apply in NMHRA retaliation claims.
The same motivating factor causation standard that applies to NMHRA
discrimination claims should apply to NMHRA retaliation claims because of two
statutory construction principles. First, a statutory scheme must be interpreted in a
way “to make the whole consistent.”116 Implementing the same causation standard
for NMHRA discrimination and retaliation claims would make the courts’ reading
of the NMHRA consistent. Second, “a legislatively enacted section heading may be
useful in determining legislative intent in a statute which is ambiguously drafted.”117

112. See Behrmann v. Phototron Corp., 1990-NMSC-073, 110 N.M. 323, 795 P.2d 1015.
113. See Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571.
114. See Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548.
115. See Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 2013-NMCA-073, 306 P.3d 524.
116. Reed v. Styron, 1961-NMSC-119, ¶ 23, 69 N.M. 262, 365 P.2d 912, 917.
117. Serrano v. State, Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 1992-NMCA-015, ¶ 12, 113 N.M. 444,
827 P.2d 159, 162; see also State ex rel. Sedillo v. Sargent, 1918-NMSC-042, ¶ 10, 24 N.M. 333, 171 P.
790, 792 (“In construing statutes, if the meaning thereof is doubtful, the title, if expressive, may have the
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Under the NMHRA, both status-based discrimination and retaliation are listed under
the section heading, “Section 28-1-7, ‘Unlawful discriminatory practice.’” Further,
the Act’s grievance procedure in Section 28-1-10 applies to both status-based
discrimination claims and retaliation claims. The complaint procedure is the same
and is administered by the same agencies. The legislature’s choice to include both
provisions (status-based discrimination and retaliation) under the same section
heading, governed by the same grievance procedure and administrative processes,
may indicate that the legislature intended for both provisions to be considered
together, with the same analytical framework and causation standard.
Since the NMHRA includes the status-based discrimination and retaliation
provisions in the same section, Nassar’s statutory construction argument does not
apply to the NMHRA.118 The United States Supreme Court in Nassar argued that the
motivating factor standard explicitly stated in the status-based discrimination section
of Title VII should not apply to the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII because it
is in a separate section of the statue from the status-based discrimination provision.119
That is not the case in the NMHRA. As noted above, the Court in Nassar stated,
“Just as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its
structural choices.”120 The same reasoning applies here: just as the New Mexico
legislature’s choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural
choices.
3.

Motivating Factor Causation Standard in NMHRA Retaliation
Claims Supports the Purpose of the NMHRA.

The purpose of the NMHRA is to protect employees from unlawful
discrimination and retaliation in the workplace.121 The NMHRA is designed to
prevent all forms of retaliation, even if other factors aside from retaliatory animus
contributed to an employer’s adverse action against a worker.122 A motivating factor
causation standard accounts for unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory animus, even
when the employer can offer alternative reasons for its actions against an employee.
Further, the New Mexico Human Rights Act provides broader rights and protections

effect to resolve the doubts by extension of the purview or by restraining it, or to correct an obvious
error.”).
118. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 355 (2013).
119. Id. at 353.
120. Id.
121. Lobato v. State Env’t Dep’t, 2012-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 267 P.3d 65, 67; cf. Alexandra Zabinski,
Surviving the “Pretext” Stage of McDonnell Douglas: Should Employment Discrimination and
Retaliation Plaintiffs Prove “Motivating Factors” or But-For Causation? 40 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J.
PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 280, 302 (2019) (“The legislature’s broad language—’freedom from discrimination’
and ‘without . . . discrimination’—implies that discriminatory decision making is intolerable even if a
discriminatory decision could be justified on other grounds. ‘Freedom from discrimination’ means
freedom from discriminatory processes, not just discriminatory outcomes.”).
122. Cf. Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571, 575 (“The
purpose behind the NMHRA is to prohibit all forms of employment sexual harassment. . . . Given this
purpose, we believe the Legislature did not intend for an employer to be relieved from an otherwise valid
hostile work environment claim simply because other factors aside from sex contributed to making the
employee’s work environment hostile and abusive.”).
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than its federal analogue.123 When the federal approach to employment retaliation
law has become less accessible to plaintiffs, it is up to the states to provide greater
protections to employees to ensure that viable claims are heard.
Fair and efficient enforcement of the NMHRA is a difficult task. New
Mexico courts have adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework to strive for just
that. The United States Supreme Court in Nassar reasoned that a motivating factor
causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims would lead to employees bringing
“frivolous” and “unfounded” claims.124 But, the United States Supreme Court failed
to account for the exhaustive administrative process that an employee must complete
before even bringing a claim to district court.125 The required administrative process
together with the McDonnell Douglas analysis would effectively block any potential
frivolous claims, before a fact finder applied a motivating factor causation standard
to an NMHRA retaliation claim.
The procedural differences between status-based discrimination claims and
retaliation claims do not warrant a different causation standard either. New Mexico
courts undergo the same McDonnell Douglas analysis for both types of claims.
Status-based discrimination claims arise when an employer commits an adverse
employment action based on an employee’s personal traits, including race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin.126 Retaliation claims arise when an employer
commits an adverse employment action against an employee based on “protected
employee conduct,” such as filing a complaint against the employer for
discrimination.127 Both claims arise from similarly situated, illegal conduct that can
be evaluated using the same standard of causation. Further, the anti-retaliation and
anti-discrimination portions of the NMHRA share the same purpose of securing antidiscrimination protections for employees. Anti-retaliation laws make it so that
employees feel that they can safely file a discrimination complaint. Without effective
protection against retaliation, anti-discrimination laws would be rendered useless to
employees.128
4.

CONCLUSION

New Mexico courts should apply a motivating factor causation standard to
NMHRA retaliation claims. Nassar does not govern the causation standard for statebased retaliation claims in New Mexico. The McDonnell Douglas framework works
most fairly and efficiently for all parties involved (employer, employee, and the
court) when the fact finder follows a motivating factor causation standard. New
Mexico’s caselaw also favors this approach to McDonnell Douglas. Ultimately, if a
fact finder has the opportunity to carefully evaluate all factors—retaliatory and non-

123. E.g., Lobato, 2012-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 267 P.3d at 67 (“Unlike the Civil Rights Act, the NMHRA
permits unlawful discrimination claims against individuals.”).
124. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013).
125. Luboyeski v. Hill, 1994-NMSC-032, ¶ 7, 117 N.M. 380, 872 P.2d 353, 355 (“Individual
defendants cannot be sued in district court under the Human Rights Act unless and until the complainant
exhausts her administrative remedies against them.”).
126. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 368 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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retaliatory—in its retaliation determination, then the NMHRA is more likely to serve
its intended function: to ensure a tolerant, hospitable, and accommodating work
environment for every New Mexican.

